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Motivation (2)
 Focus on executive compensation
 Sparse evidence for lower-level employees
Two studies on commercial loan officers:
 Agarwal and Wang (2009) find that loan officers in a US commercial bank dramatically increased their output after the bank changed their incentive package from fixed wage to fixed wage plus commission. However, the quality of these loans was considerably reduced and the bank soon reverted to the previous incentive structure.  Hertzberg et al. (2010) illustrates that commercial loan officers reduce their optimistic bias when the threat of rotation becomes imminent. Asterisks denote significance at 1 percent (**) and 5 percen t (*) levels.
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Results (5)
Is the output time-dependent?
The increase in output is gradual (for originated applications)
Zero distance denotes the last working day of the month, while the maximum distance is thirty days. 
Results (7)
Increased effort or decreased quality?
The decrease in the processing time is gradual (for originated applications)
Zero distance denotes the last working day of the month, while the maximum distance is thirty days.  EoM approvals have lower FICO, higher LTV, and higher DTI. Pricing is no different for EoM approvals.  Although originating some mortgages of marginally lower-quality, the mortgage officers were appropriately pricing these loans for the additional risk.
Increased effort or decreased quality?
(Probit) The dependent variable reflects the likelihood of approval Asterisks denote significan ce at 1 percent (**) and 5 percent (*) levels. 
